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ABSTRACT
This essay examines the transformation of a local rule of thumb into a widely
acknowledged meteorological law, generally known as Buys Ballot’s law. This law
relates wind direction to atmospheric pressure. From 1857 to 1867, Christophorus
Buys Ballot (1817–1890) actively lobbied in the international arena for his wind rule,
which he regarded as a promising basis for a system of storm warnings. At the same
time he was reluctant to generalize his rule beyond the Dutch boundaries or to make
strong claims about its predictive nature. Initially he failed to interest foreign
meteorologists in his work, partly because of a widespread scepticism with regard to
meteorological predictions, and partly because some of his foreign colleagues
favored competing theories. One of his main rivals in this respect was Robert Fitzroy,
director of the British Meteorological Office, who had set up his own warning system.
This practice provoked the wrath of the Royal Society, as its members regarded
Fitzroy’s theories and the resulting predictions as unscientific. After his death the
Society took the British Meteorological Office under its control and abolished the
practice of storm warnings. The resulting wave of protests from people who felt they
had benefitted from the warnings landed the Society in an awkward predicament.
The warnings could only be reintroduced without losing face if they had a ‘‘scientific’’
basis, and therefore finding a sound basis for storm predictions became a matter of
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urgency. At last Buys Ballot found a willing ear for his campaign. A rapid verification of
his wind rule in Britain sufficed for the introduction of the unprecedented expression
‘‘Buys Ballot’s law’’ in the Royal Society reports. From these authoritative reports the
designation rapidly spread all over the world, thus becoming a current expression.
KEY WORDS: history of meteorology, laws of nature, storm warnings, weather prediction,
forecasts, Christopher Buys Ballot, Robert Fitzroy, British Meteorological Office
Given the prominent role of laws of nature in modern science, it seems
appropriate to ask what it takes for an empirical regularity to be crowned with
this privileged designation ‘‘law.’’ Unlike philosophers, whose reﬂections on
natural laws have ﬁlled many volumes, historians have mostly ignored this
question.1 This is even more surprising as the question is arguably largely an
empirical one. Historical contingencies have always played a role in the allo-
cation of the label ‘‘law.’’ Originally, when the concept was linked with the
seventeenth-century rise of the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy as well as
the concept of a divine lawgiver, the label was usually reserved for the so-called
laws of motion.2 However, it did not take long before the designation was
broadened to include many other regularities, such as Newton’s law of uni-
versal gravitation and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion.
In the nineteenth century the number of laws rapidly increased as they came
to be seen as the hallmark of science, and especially of the more exact sciences
that made predictions possible. In Victorian Britain, John Herschel and
William Whewell clearly stressed the primacy of laws as the goals of research
1. For a general overview of the philosophical literature on ‘‘laws of nature,’’ see, for example,
John W. Carroll, ‘‘Laws of Nature,’’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta (Spring 2012 edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/laws-of-nature/
(accessed 11 Aug 2014). Historians have mostly discussed the introduction of the concept of laws
of nature in the early modern period; see John Henry, ‘‘Metaphysics and the Origins of Modern
Science: Descartes and the Importance of Laws of Nature,’’ Early Science and Medicine 9, no. 2
(2004): 73–114; Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, eds., Natural Law and Laws of Nature in
Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2008); Friedrich Steinle, ‘‘The Amalgamation of a Concept: Laws of Nature in the New
Sciences,’’ in Friedel Weinert, ed., Laws of Nature. Essays on the Philosophical, Scientiﬁc and
Historical Dimensions (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995) 316–68.
2. For the precedent being created by Descartes, cf. Henry, ‘‘Metaphysics’’ (ref. 1), 97. In this
regard even Newton followed Descartes, at least in his Principia (1687), where he did not speak of
either Kepler’s laws or a law of gravitation, but only of ‘‘laws of motion.’’ See Curtis A. Wilson,
‘‘Kepler’s Laws, So-Called,’’ Newsletter of the Historical Astronomy Division of the American
Astronomical Society 31 (1994): 1–2.
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in their authoritative writings on the nature of science, and in this respect they
were echoed throughout the Victorian era. Thus, Herschel emphasized in his
Preliminary Discourse of the Study of Natural Philosophy that ‘‘we must never
forget that . . . laws, not insulated independent facts, . . . are the objects of
enquiry to the natural philosopher.’’3 And in the concluding paragraph, he
stated that ‘‘science . . . refers all its advances to the discovery of general laws.’’4
Whewell was no less explicit: ‘‘our knowledge of nature is our knowledge of
laws.’’5
Yet, not all empirical or theoretical regularities, mathematical or otherwise,
were actually designated laws. So, what was it that made a natural regularity
a law in the eyes of nineteenth-century authorities? Instead of suggesting
a general answer to this question, we propose to consider in one particular
case how an empirical generalization came to be called a ‘‘law.’’ The law in
question is Buys Ballot’s law, which describes the relationship between the
wind direction and the spatial distribution of atmospheric pressure. Its impor-
tance was enhanced by the scarcity of such general principles in this burgeon-
ing discipline.
In the early nineteenth century the status of meteorology was ambiguous.
Lacking a strong theoretical foundation for its mostly empirical practice, it
could hardly boast scientiﬁc credentials. Endless readings of thermometers and
barometers by individual observers had done little to uncover the underlying
principles of the daily weather conditions. In 1831, John Herschel (1792–1871)
wrote of meteorology ‘‘as one of the most complicated and difﬁcult, but at the
same time interesting, subjects of physical research; one, however, which has
of late begun to be studied with a diligence which promises the speedy
disclosure of relations and laws of which at present we can form but a very
imperfect notion.’’ Fifteen years later Buys Ballot still spoke of ‘‘a science
which hardly deserves that name’’ and ‘‘which rarely succeeds in connecting
3. John F. W. Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (London:
Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1831), 13–14.
4. Ibid., 360; For laws in terrestrial physics, see Gregory A. Good, ‘‘A Shift of View: Mete-
orology in John Herschel’s Terrestrial Physics,’’ in Intimate Universality: Local and Global Themes
in the History of Weather and Climate, ed. James Roger Fleming, Vladimir Jankovic, and Deborah
R. Coen (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications/USA, 2006), 37.
5. W. Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural Theology
(London: William Pickering, 1839), 3, 11. As Michael Ruse put it: ‘‘Whewell saw a scientiﬁc
theory, in ideal, as being composed of universal statements, or laws.’’ M. Ruse, ‘‘William
Whewell: Omniscientist,’’ inWilliamWhewell: A Composite Portrait, ed. M. Fisch and S. Schaffer
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 88.
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its results.’’6 The model to be emulated was physical astronomy, where
Newton’s law of gravitation, combined with his laws of motion, allowed for
precise predictions.7
The diligence Herschel discerned was, indeed, very present. Meteorology
participated in the general boom of terrestrial physics. In the wake of the
vigorous campaign by the German traveler and polymath Alexander von
Humboldt (1769–1859) for worldwide measurements of terrestrial magnetism,
atmospheric pressures, temperatures, winds, tides, and ocean currents, several
governments and scientiﬁc societies started to invest large sums of money in
such Humboldtian endeavors. In many cases practical interests of trade, public
health, and agriculture combined with theoretical ambitions, the ultimate
ambition being the discovery of fundamental laws.8
Buys Ballot’s law was actually not the ﬁrst so-called meteorological law.
During the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, the Berlin professor of physics,
Heinrich Dove (1803–1879), had suggested that as a rule the direction of the
wind changes in a clockwise direction in the Northern hemisphere. This rule
came to be known as Dove’s law or the ‘‘law of the turning of the wind’’ (in
German, Drehungsgesetz). This law was often confused with the so-called law
of storms, which stated that in the Northern hemisphere cyclones are charac-
terized by an anti-clockwise motion of the air around an area of low pressure.
Both laws were eventually subsumed under Buys Ballot’s law. In fact, Dove’s
law traversed the opposite path from a general law to a local rule. It was
eventually seen as a consequence of the eastward motion of depressions
through Northern Europe, resulting in the indicated change of direction of
the winds at points south of the center of a depression.9
It was only around 1870 that meteorology could claim a more durable law,
the one that we still designate as Buys Ballot’s law. Its canonization took
approximately ten years. In the process, which was far from straightforward,
a local rule of thumb, dating from 1857, was generalized, transformed, and
6. Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse (ref. 3), 328–29; C.H.D. Buys Ballot, Toespraak over de
noodzakelijkheid eener veelzijdige beoefening van wetenschap (Utrecht, Kemink en Zoon, 1846), 37.
7. Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse (ref. 3), 265–73.
8. For Humboldtian Science, see S. F. Cannon, Science in Culture (New York, 1978), 73–110;
J. Cawood, ‘‘Terrestrial Magnetism and the Development of International Collaboration in the
Early Nineteenth Century,’’ Annals of Science 34 (1977): 551–87; W. H. Brock, ‘‘Humboldt and
the British: A Note on the Character of British Science,’’ Annals of Science 50 (1993): 365–72.
9. We will pass over the gradual eclipse of Dove’s law, a story that we reserve for another
occasion.
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elevated to the status of law. In studying this process, we hope to shed light on
two deceptively simple questions: why was it named a law, and why Buys
Ballot’s law? As we shall see neither of these questions allows for a simple
answer. Buys Ballot was not the ﬁrst to propose that winds blow at right angles
to pressure gradients; he was reluctant to generalize his local ﬁndings and
did not speak of a law, largely as he was unable to fully grasp its underlying
cause.10 He did encourage others to verify his rule at other geographical loca-
tions, but he had a hard time in drawing attention to his work outside of the
Netherlands.
The story of Buys Ballot’s law is profoundly geographical in many respects.
Buys Ballot used the safe and speedy crossing of Dutch ships to far-away places
to solicit government support for his meteorological endeavors. As we will see,
it took the full area of the Dutch territory to ﬁnd a relationship between winds
and pressure distribution. Both the size and the ﬂatness of the country,
expressed in its very name, were particularly helpful in creating an almost ideal
atmospheric laboratory. And it took a geographical expansion of the observa-
tional network to other areas beyond the Dutch borders to expand the local
rule into a global relationship. Place and scale are essential in the establishment
of a meaningful atmospheric relationship based on observation of ﬁckle
weather conditions.11
But the creation of the law was as much a social as an intellectual and
geographical achievement. For Buys Ballot, expanding his rule required
expanding his network and his international reputation, but it is doubtful
whether this in itself would have sufﬁced for its eventual transformation
into a law. On the one hand, meteorology was a highly competitive ﬁeld, and
10.Well-known precedents, to a smaller or larger extent, among several others are Humphrey
Lloyd, ‘‘Notes on the Meteorology of Ireland,’’ Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy 22 (1856):
411–96, esp. 461; and William Ferrel, ‘‘Essay on the Winds and the Currents of the Ocean,’’
Nashville Journal of Medicine and Surgery 11 (1856): 7–19.
11. For another exemplary instance of a progression from the local study of atmospheric
phenomena to an international meteorological project on a global scale, see: Deborah R. Coen,
‘‘Scaling Down. The ‘Austrian’ Climate between Empire and Republic,’’ in Intimate Universality:
Local and Global Themes in the History of Weather and Climate, ed. James Roger Fleming,
Vladimir Jankovic, and Deborah R. Coen (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications/
USA, 2006), 115–40. For a general overview of the role of geographical elements and, more gen-
erally, the spatial turn in the history of science, see David Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place:
Geographies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003). For the spatial
aspects of Humboldtian science see Simon Naylor, ‘‘Introduction: historical geographies of
science—places, contexts, cartographies,’’ British Journal for the History of Science 38 (2005): 9–10.
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rivalry among the competitors was strong. On the other hand, even general
acceptance would not automatically turn a rule into a law. The eventual
transformation into a law appears to have resulted at least partly from speciﬁc
British concerns at a very speciﬁc moment, namely the need to provide scien-
tiﬁc credentials to meteorology and, more particularly, to the practice of storm
warnings in the wake of institutional changes. In this particular case, then, the
use of the term ‘‘law’’ seems to have been at least partly strategic.
In this essay we will discuss Buys Ballot’s meteorological aims and endea-
vors, the institutionalization of Dutch meteorology, the ﬁrst formulation of the
Dutch wind rule in 1857, its application in the Dutch practice of storm warn-
ings, and Buys Ballot’s persistent, though unsuccessful, attempts to draw
attention to the rule abroad. We will also discuss the emergence of the British
Meteorological Ofﬁce, headed by Captain Robert Fitzroy (1805–1865), the
controversial British practice of storm warnings, and ﬁnally the institutional
changes and the resulting social pressures that resulted in the British espousal
of Buys Ballot’s work.12 Two polarities permeate this story. Firstly, there is the
tension between the aim to uncover the underlying principles of the weather,
and thereby turn meteorology into a true science, and the practical needs and
interests of seafarers, primarily interested in swift and safe voyages across the
oceans. Secondly, there is a tension between the widely perceived need for
cooperation and the strong rivalry between the participants, who cherished
their own pet theories and who competed for leadership in this new, burgeon-
ing ﬁeld.
BUYS BALLOT AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE DUTCH
METEOROLOGICAL INSTITUTE
During his student days at the University of Utrecht, Buys Ballot had both an
omnivorous appetite for knowledge and lofty aspirations. It was only with
great reluctance that he gave up his philological studies to focus on the
sciences. In his youthful ambition he developed a general scheme that aimed
to account for all physical and chemical processes in terms of the attractive and
repulsive forces operating between point-like material and ether particles, and
the resulting vibratory motions. His level-headed supervisors dissuaded him
12. For British debates on meteorological predictions, see Katharine Anderson, Predicting the
Weather: Victorians and the Science of Meteorology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 2005).
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from publishing his speculative ideas.13 As he would later conﬁde to the Dutch
chemist Jacobus van ’t Hoff (1852–1911), it was the resulting disillusionment
that made him take up meteorology ‘‘as a plaything.’’14 Although his ambitions
were as strong as ever, he learned to be more careful in the future. After he
obtained his doctorate in 1844, he did not look for a position. As a man of
independent means, he chose to continue his studies with the Utrecht math-
ematician Richard van Rees (1797–1875). The following year he solicited the
university board for an unpaid lectureship. For the next two years he taught
geology, mineralogy, and ‘‘theoretical chemistry.’’ Meanwhile he analyzed large
sets of meteorological observations made in several places in Holland over
several decades in the hope of ﬁnding some meaningful patterns in the ﬂuc-
tuating temperatures in so far as they differed from the daily and annual
variations.15 His interest in meteorology was strongly connected to the new
Humboldtian wave. Already as a student he had assisted Van Rees in a series of
meterological measurements as part of an international meteorological project,
initiated by Herschel and taken over by the Belgian mathematician Adolphe
Quetelet (1796–1874).16
In 1847, he was appointed extraordinary professor of mathematics at
Utrecht University. By then he had consulted several friends and colleagues
about his plans to establish an observatory for meteorology and terrestrial
magnetism. He rented a small house on the ramparts of the city and borrowed
some instruments from the physical cabinet. Additional instruments were
designed and built by his friend and former fellow student Frederik Krecke
(1812–1882), who agreed to take care of the measurements. These measure-
ments effectively started in 1848.17 The project involved the creation of a Dutch
network of observers in different parts of the country who would read their
instruments thrice a day at ﬁxed points in time, in accordance with a protocol
established at Utrecht. Buys Ballot undertook the processing and publication
of all the assembled data and was careful not to overburden these volunteers.
He made no demands with regard to precision, nor did he ensure that
the instruments used elsewhere were calibrated or compared with those in
13. J. P. van der Stok, ‘‘Levensbericht C.H.D. Buys Ballot,’’ Jaarboek der Koninklijke Ne-
derlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen (1899): 59–100, on 67–68.
14. E. van Everdingen, C.H.D. Buys Ballot 1817–1890 (’s-Gravenhage: D.A. Daamen, 1953), 32.
15. Ibid., 56–58.
16. F. van Lunteren, ‘‘De oprichting van het Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut:
Humboldtiaanse wetenschap, internationale samenwerking en praktisch nut,’’Gewina 21 (1998): 219.
17. Ibid., 229–30; Richard van Rees to Adolphe Quetelet, 18 Jul 1849, CAQ, Collection 2095.
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Utrecht.18 To reduce the effects of systematic errors he requested deviations
from the mean values rather than absolute measurements.19
In addition to his disappointing experiences in physical theorizing, there
were positive factors informing his choice for a large meteorological research
project. As he stressed on several occasions, in spite of numerous observations
the ﬁeld was still in its infancy. Theoretical foundations had not been devel-
oped or, to put it differently, the ﬁeld still awaited its Newton.20 As Buys
Ballot told his students in 1846, anyone looking for fame would be well advised
to turn to a branch of science as yet hardly deserving that name. A ‘‘lucky ﬁnd’’
could bring about a revolution.21 In this respect Buys Ballot shared the view held
by other leading ﬁgures in science. John Herschel, for example, noted in 1831 that
‘‘meteorology, one of the most complicated but important branches of science, is
at the same time one in which any person who will attend to plain rules, and
bestow the necessary degree of attention, may do effectual service.’’22 As late as
1867, a leading ﬁgure in British meteorology, George Symons (1838–1900),
would remark, ‘‘When this Newton of Meteorology is to arise, we know not.’’23
In the late 1840s Buys Ballot considered the time ripe for such a break-
through. His optimism was partly inspired by the swift developments in
electric telegraphy. The telegraph would enable a rapid exchange of meteoro-
logical data collected at widespread locations.24 Moreover, Alexander von Hum-
boldt had paved the way for a science of meteorology by pioneering worldwide
depictions of average thermometric and barometric conditions, so-called iso-
therms and isobars. The next step, already initiated by Heinrich Dove, was to
measure disturbances or deviations from these mean values and to ﬁnd the laws
regulating such disturbances. The ultimate goal was to emulate the predictive
capacity that characterized all exact sciences, above all astronomy.25
18. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘Iets over de meteorologische waarnemingen aan het observatorium
te Utrecht,’’ Algemeene Konst- en Letterbode (1848): 379–84.
19. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘On the great importance of deviations from the mean state of the
atmosphere for the science of meteorology,’’ The London, Edinburgh and Dublin Philosophical
Magazine 37 (1850): 42–49.
20. Van der Stok, ‘‘Levensbericht’’ (ref. 13), 65.
21. Buys Ballot, Toespraak (ref. 6), 37.
22. Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse (ref. 3), 133.
23. George J. Symons, ‘‘Reviews: Sunshine and Showers: their Inﬂuence throughout Creation:
A Compendium of Popular Meteorology, By Andrew Steinmetz,’’ Symons’s Monthly Meteorological
Magazine 2 (1867): 33–34, on 34.
24. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 53.
25. Jack Morrel and Arnold Thackray, Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1981), 513.
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With regard to the future prospects of weather predictions, Buys Ballot did not
share the notorious scepticism of Franc¸ois Arago (1786–1853) or, for thatmatter, of
his former tutor Van Rees.26 Yet, as he was well aware, the current Dutch practice
of extended series of measurements at a single location would not bring this goal
nearer. As Buys Ballot stressed time and again, only synoptic measurements of
deviations from the mean values would lead to progress. Such measurements
required large-scale collaboration, preferably across international borders.
A Dutch network would not sufﬁce. To further international cooperation, Buys
Ballot and Krecke visited several European meteorologists in the summer of 1851.
Some of them agreed to exchange meteorological data with Utrecht.27
The following year Buys Ballot published his plea for a European network
with Dove’s Berlin as the center. Further expansion should result in a world-
wide net of observatories. Once that was in place, ‘‘trade and agriculture would
reap the same fruit, as was now harvested by broad navigation.’’28 In private he
hoped for a leading role for himself.29 Such a role, however, required institu-
tional backing and preferably some kind of public sanction. So far the obser-
vatory had been little more than a private enterprise, partly funded by grants
from local societies. To secure the project in the long term and, more impor-
tantly, to obtain the authority enabling him to operate on the international
stage, Buys Ballot needed the Dutch state to adopt his observatory and turn it
into a national institute. In the summer of 1852 he turned to the Minister of the
Interior, Johan Rudolph Thorbecke.30
In his request for government support, Buys Ballot immediately played his
trump card. As a seafaring nation and the center of a colonial empire, the
Netherlands would beneﬁt considerably from improved knowledge of maritime
winds and currents.31 Such knowledge would drastically reduce the length of
ocean voyages. In this regard he referred to the Sailing Directions, based on large
numbers of ship’s logs, collated by Matthew Fontaine Maury (1806–1873), the
superintendent of the Naval Observatory in Washington. If Dutch navy and
26. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, Les changements pe´riodiques de tempe´rature (Utrecht: Kemink & Fils,
1847), 116–17.
27. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 59.
28. C.H.D. Buys Ballot,Meteorologische waarnemingen in Nederland 1851 (Utrecht: Kemink &
Zoon, 1852), ii.
29. Van der Stok, ‘‘Levensbericht’’ (ref. 13), 75.
30. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 63–64.
31. H. G. Cannegieter, Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut 1854–1954 (’s-Gravenhage:
Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1954), 27–28.
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merchant ships made their logs available through the mediation of a national
institute, Maury promised to provide them with his latest sea charts and sailing
directions.32
Buys Ballot’s connections in seafaring circles probably dated from early 1850.
He found a strong ally in the Dutch naval ofﬁcer Marin Henry Jansen (1817–
1893). Jansen lobbied the Minister of the Navy on behalf of Buys Ballot, re-
questing that he would receive the logbooks ofDutchwarships.33 The following
year Jansen met Maury in Washington, which resulted in a lifelong friendship.
Jansen became a staunch supporter of Maury’s project, which effectively ce-
mented his alliance with Buys Ballot.34 In a sense, they were thrown into each
other’s company. Being a sailor himself, Jansen could overcome the distrust that
many sailors held against the pretences of university professors. As a naval ofﬁcer
he could moreover mediate with the Minister of the Navy. Most importantly,
Maury’s program promised concrete short-term results. In turn, Buys Ballot’s
university chair conferred the necessary scientiﬁc status on their joint enterprise.35
Although Thorbecke was sufﬁciently impressed by Buys Ballot’s plea to
promise an annual subsidy, it is doubtful whether he would have allowed the
creation of a state institution. The liberal statesman strongly favored private
initiative and therefore restraint in government involvement in scientiﬁc af-
fairs. But his government was brought down in early 1853, and his successor
Van Reenen eventually supported the foundation of a Dutch meteorological
institute.36 What probably tipped the scales was the Brussels international
conference on maritime meteorology, organized by Maury, which aimed to
establish a uniform system of measurements as well as the expansion of Ma-
ury’s enterprise. The Netherlands was represented by Jansen. His report of the
meeting to the Minister of the Navy helped secure support for the establish-
ment of the state institute.37
32. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 62.
33. Ibid., 60.
34. For the collaboration between Jansen and Maury see Azadeh Achbari, ‘‘Building Net-
works for Science: Conﬂict and Cooperation in Nineteenth-Century Global Marine Studies,’’ Isis
106 (2015): 257–82.
35. The termsuponwhichMaury’sSailingDirectionswere furnished to theDutchmerchant ships
were conﬁrmed in Jansen’s later correspondence with Maury. Marin Jansen to Matthew Maury,
28 Jul 1852, RNO, LR, Box 11; Matthew Maury to Marin Jansen, 7 May 1853, RNO, LS, vol. 9.
36. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 63–66.
37. Maritime Conference held at Brussels for devising an uniform system of meteorological ob-
servations at sea. August and September 1853 (Brussels, 1853), 58; Minister of the Navy to Marin
Jansen, 24 Jun 1853, MN, Box 2274.
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In January 1854, Buys Ballot’s observatory was expanded and formally
transformed into the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute. Buys Ballot was
appointed superintendent, supervising two departments, one for terrestrial
meteorology, headed by Krecke, the other for maritime meteorology, run by
a naval ofﬁcer. The ﬁrst of these was Jansen himself, who was deeply disap-
pointed by the arrangement. Firstly, he detested his subordinance to Buys
Ballot. Secondly, he deplored the establishment of the maritime department
in the inland town of Utrecht, rather than in a seaport. To aggravate the
situation, Jansen and Buys Ballot strongly disagreed about the prescribed
measurements to be taken. Jansen repeatedly upbraided Buys Ballot for his
ignorance of nautical matters. Within a year the Minister of the Navy inter-
vened and Jansen was replaced by another ofﬁcer.38
STORMS, WARNINGS, AND BAROMETER READINGS
Maury’s initiatives, particularly the Brussels conference, also spurred other
European states to create or support meteorological institutes. Britain estab-
lished a government ofﬁce in 1854 under the auspices of the Board of Trade’s
Marine Department, which was to collect and process meteorological data.
Known as the Meteorological Department, the ofﬁce was headed by naval
ofﬁcer Robert Fitzroy, who received the title of Meteorological Statist.39 The
French acted more slowly. Not until 1859 did the French government delegate
the implementation of the Brussels arrangement to the hydrographical service
of the Ministry of Marine, the De´poˆt de la Marine.40
The Brussels conference was not the only incentive to meteorological in-
itiatives at the time. The Crimean War likewise enabled the advocates of the
ﬁeld to press home the need for greater collaborative efforts. In March 1854,
Britain and France formally declared war on Russia, and in September allied
forces besieged the city of Sevastopol, home of the Russian Black Sea ﬂeet.
A violent storm on November 14th of that year ruined the Allies’ camps and
38. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 67–72. The correspondence among Jansen, Buys
Ballot, and the Minister of the Navy throughout 1854 is kept at the Utrecht Archives, KNMI, Box
1199.
39. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 108–109; Edward Sabine to Matthew Maury, 13
Jan 1854, RNO, LR, Box 13.
40. Fabien Locher, Le savant et la tempeˆte: E´tudier l’atmosphe`re et pre´voir le temps au XIXe sie`cle
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008), 148–51.
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sank several of their battle ships. Originating in the Atlantic, the storm that hit
the allied troops had progressed across Europe for several days before arriving at
the Black Sea. Had there been a telegraph line connecting Crimea to Western
Europe, a warning might have reduced the losses.41
At least this was the claim made by Urbain Le Verrier (1811–1877), the
astronomer who found Neptune. He had succeeded Arago as director of the
Paris Observatory, now renamed the Imperial Observatory. While reorganiz-
ing the observatory, Le Verrier developed ambitious plans for its Meteorolog-
ical Department. These plans involved the collection of simultaneous
observations by telegraph as well as telegraphic storm warnings. His plans were
endorsed by the government, although their implementation had to wait
for several more years.42 The use of a meteorological network for collecting
data and passing on warnings had also been envisaged by Joseph Henry at the
Smithsonian Institution in Washington.43
In both the American and French schemes, the warnings were to be based
upon information about actual storms and their projected trajectories. More
ambitious, but also more controversial, methods were proposed by the end of
the 1850s in both Britain and the Netherlands. In these plans, warnings were
not to be based only on storms already observed, but on storm predictions as
well. In the past, such predictions had faced the censure of critics like Arago. In
1846, for instance, Arago remarked, ‘‘However science may advance, worthy
philosophers who care for their reputation will never venture to predict the
weather.’’44 Fitzroy and Buys Ballot, however, did not share this scepticism,
the ﬁrst basing his optimism on his many years of experience as a sailor, the
second on simultaneous meteorological observations.45
Buys Ballot proposed an empirical basis for a Dutch warning system in 1857,
when he presented a brief note at the Amsterdam Academy in which he related
the force of the wind in Holland to the distribution of pressure.46 By the mid
41. James Burton, ‘‘History of the British Meteorological Ofﬁce to 1905’’ (PhD dissertation,
Open University, 1988), 39.
42. Locher, Le savant (ref. 40), 33–39.
43. James Rodger Fleming, Meteorology in America, 1800–1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 145.
44. ‘‘Jamais, quels que puissent eˆtre les progre`s de la science, les savants de bonne foi et
soucieux de leur re´putation ne se hasarderont a` pre´dire les temps.’’ Arago’s remark is quoted in
Van der Stok, ‘‘Levensbericht’’ (ref. 13), 77; and in Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 40.
45. Buys Ballot, Les changements (ref. 26), 116–17; Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 39–42.
46. Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen: Afdeeling
Natuurkunde 7 (1857): 75–77.
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1850s his network of meteorological stations encompassed Groningen and Den
Helder in the north of the country, Maastricht and Vlissingen in the south,
and Utrecht and Nijmegen in the middle, covering the entire area of the
country. Observations over ﬁve successive years had shown that neither the
height of the barometer at a single location, nor its rapid rise or fall provided
a sufﬁcient indication of the prospect of strong winds. The best indication
stemmed from the differences in the barometer readings:
The difference between simultaneous absolute readings or deviations from
the normal reading gives the most certain indication, even when one pays
attention to places not too far apart. For out of a thousand times when,
within the conﬁnes of the Netherlands, this difference at eight in the
morning was less than two millimetres, the force of the wind never increased
beyond thirty kilograms per square metre within twenty-four hours, and out
of two hundred times when the difference was more than four millimetres,
the wind attained a greater strength ﬁfty times.47
Buys Ballot immediately went on to spell out the practical consequences of
these results. As he stressed, given this strong correlation it would be desirable
to use the telegraph each morning to inform all Dutch harbors of the barom-
eter readings at Groningen in the north of the country and Maastricht in the
south so as to enable ships to anticipate storms. Only at a later stage did Buys
Ballot add some comments on the direction of the wind:
The direction was or always became easterly (between NE and SE), when
the reading was higher in Groningen and Den Helder than in Maastricht.
And always west or south west, when higher at Maastricht than at Den
Helder, almost without exception.48
This early note was a far cry from what later became known as Buys Ballot’s
law. In this brief note there was no attempt to generalize these local rules of
thumb, nor any endeavor to explain them. The counter-intuitive relationship
between the direction of the wind and the pressure gradient did not receive any
comment and was evidently judged to be of secondary importance.
Buys Ballot seemed more concerned about the practical consequences than
about the theoretical underpinnings of his wind rule. In October 1859, he
consulted Eduard Wenckebach, Inspector of the telegraphic service in the
Netherlands, to discuss the practicalities of his newly invented system of storm
47. Ibid., 76.
48. Ibid., 76.
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warnings. According to his rule, strong winds could be expected when the
difference between the barometric readings at the northern and southern
stations in the country was more than four millimeters. When storms were
approaching, he proposed to send warnings to the main harbors containing
information on the readings taken at Groningen and Maastricht, and the
direction of the winds in the next 24 hours. The message was in the following
form: ‘‘[barometer reading taken at Maastricht] [direction of the wind]
[barometer reading taken at Groningen] [difference in barometer readings]
or for example 51.8 WSW 45.-6.8.’’49
By the end of the month, he adjusted his plan and proposed to issue daily
weather reports early in the morning to telegraph clerks in major seaports. By
instructing the clerks about the rule of barometric differences and the expected
direction of the wind, they could decide themselves whether storm warnings
were needed and whether safety measures should be taken. In addition, Buys
Ballot suggested that the weather reports be published on notice boards as well
for the public to view.50 In the following months Buys Ballot submitted his
proposal to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Navy. OnMay
21, 1860, the Minister of the Interior decided in favor of the proposal, and the
Dutch telegraphic system of weather reporting and storm warning was in full
operation by June 1st.51
In his 1857 note to the Dutch Academy, Buys Ballot had announced a more
extensive publication in the Academy’s Proceedings on his wind rule.52 This
promise never materialized. He did, however, in 1860 publish a pamphlet
accompanying the introduction of the telegraphic weather reports in June of
that year. Entitled A few rules for forthcoming weather change in the Netherlands,
the brochure aimed at the general public rather than his professional collea-
gues. It started with an extensive explanation of the working of the mercury
barometer, including instructions for its manufacture. Basing his comments on
statistical data assembled during the three previous years, he subsequently
offered several indications for forthcoming rain and, once again, for the force
and direction of winds. It is here that we ﬁnd the classic phrasing of what was
to become Buys Ballot’s law:
49. Buys Ballot to Eduard Wenckebach, 19 Oct 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
50. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 31 Oct 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
51. J. Schro¨der, ‘‘Excerpt from Resolution by the Minister of the Interior, dated 21May 1860,’’
cited in C.H.D. Buys Ballot, Eenige regelen voor aanstaande weersveranderingen in Nederland
(Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon 1860), 75–76.
52. Verslagen (ref. 46), 77.
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The rule for the direction of the wind is therefore as follows: if one places
oneself in the direction of the wind with one’s back towards the place from
where it arrives, then one will have the place of lowest pressure on the left
side, just as in the case of hurricanes.53
Although this rule still only referred to local conditions in the Netherlands, the
analogy with hurricanes suggested its wider application. The anti-clockwise
motion of the air around the center of a hurricane, itself a center of depression,
in the northern hemisphere was known at the time as the ‘‘law of storms.’’54
Buys Ballot’s comparison of these phenomena suggested that weaker winds
might behave in a way similar to extremely strong winds.
The analogy also suggested an explanation as to how the wind deviates
from its direction toward the region of lowest pressure. As he pointed out,
a volume of air approaching from the south would tend to end up east of the
point of lowest pressure because of the greater longitudinal speed of the air at
lower latitudes, resulting in a spiraling motion. For a similar reason, air
coming from the north would pass the point of minimum pressure to the
west. However, he could not see why air coming from either east or west
would deviate from a straight trajectory. He therefore presented his expla-
nation with some reservations.55
As he pointed out, several others before him had tried to account for the
circulatory motion of storms:
Many attempts have been made, to ﬁnd the reason for this property of
hurricanes. The explanations, however, appear somewhat artiﬁcial, so that it
appears as if one could prove the opposite in the same manner. When it
happens occasionally, that a fact is known through observation, before
theory leads one to suspect it, it easily happens that one forgets the required
circumspection in reasoning. . . . 56
Buys Ballot’s caution manifested itself throughout the booklet. As he stressed
there repeatedly, accurate weather predictions would require information on
the distribution of meteorological variables over a complete hemisphere, not
only at sea level, but also along the vertical axis. Lacking such data, all one
could do for the time being was to ‘‘resort to . . . general rules, or even make do
53. Buys Ballot, Eenige regelen (ref. 51), 50.
54. Pauline Halford, Storm Warning: The Origins of Weather Forecast (Gloucestershire: Sutton
Publishing, 2004), 38–43.
55. Buys Ballot, Eenige regelen (ref. 51), 55–56.
56. Ibid., 54–55.
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with more local and therefore partial indications.’’57 These would only allow
one to guess the weather for the following day or at best the next few days.
Such predictions were probable rather than certain, but they could still prove
to be useful. And useful they seemed to be. Since its foundation several more
Dutch cities had requested to be part of the weather reporting network.
DISSEMINATION OF THE RULE
Buys Ballot’s wind rule did not immediately garner the international recogni-
tion he craved, notwithstanding the unﬂagging zeal with which he promoted
his work abroad. He published his work in foreign journals, visited foreign
conferences, and actively engaged in correspondences with several foreign
meteorologists and institutions.58 Above all Buys Ballot hoped to encourage
his colleagues abroad to test the validity of the wind rule in areas beyond the
reach of his stations. Hopefully such measurements would transform his local
rule into a general principle.59 However, as we shall see, arousing interest in his
empirical results as well as the conclusions he drew from those results, proved
to be extremely difﬁcult. The wind rule was either not understood or delib-
erately ignored by foreign meteorologists, who either were sceptical about
meteorological predictions or cherished rivaling schemes or principles.
In 1857, Buys Ballot published a note almost identical to the one he had
presented at the Amsterdam Academy, in the French Academy’s Comptes
Rendus.60 Very soon he started a correspondence with Le Verrier about the
use of the telegraph for the collection of meteorological data.61 In the spring of
1860, Le Verrier informed Buys Ballot about the preparatory steps taken in
France to create a storm warning system based on simultaneous observations
carried out at French ports. The Frenchman invited Buys Ballot to exchange
barometric readings taken at Den Helder, Texel, and Groningen in return for
those taken at Brest, Le Havre, and Paris.62
57. Ibid., 34.
58. Van Everdingen, Buys Ballot (ref. 14), 97.
59. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 27Dec 1859, and 29 Jun 1860, KNMI, Box 682.
60. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘Note sur les rapports de l’intensite´ et de la direction du vent avec les
e´carts simultane´es du barome`tre,’’ Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des se´ances de l’Acade´mie des
Sciences 45 (1857): 765–68.
61. Locher, Le savant (ref. 40), 43–47.
62. Buys Ballot to Le Verrier, 11 Apr 1860, KNMI, Box 682.
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The French observations were a welcome addition to Buys Ballot’s studies
of barometric differences, so he accepted the offer. Le Verrier’s letter also
prompted Buys Ballot to induce the Dutch Minister of the Interior to adopt
his storm warning system before the Frenchman introduced his. Buys Ballot
conﬁded to the minister that the French proposals for telegraphic transmission
of observations resembled his own. The only difference was that the French
were still not in a position to ‘‘understand the value of [barometric] differences
above the actual readings.’’ Nevertheless, ‘‘time was pressing’’ if the Dutch
wished to gain credit.63 In hindsight, there was no reason to worry, for the ﬁrst
French storm warnings were not dispatched until 1863.64
With regard to his attempts to disseminate the wind rule, Buys Ballot’s
contact with Le Verrier was of little use. The Frenchman stuck to his own
storm warning system based on telegraphic transmission of information about
actual storms. In this respect, Buys Ballot found a far more useful intermediary
in Maury. The latter constantly referred to the wind rule in all his major
publications as well as in his Sailing Directions accompanying his Wind and
Current Charts from 1858 onward. Like Buys Ballot himself, Maury consis-
tently presented the rule as a local one, referring to the Dutch situation. And
like Buys Ballot, he emphasized the predictive value of barometric measure-
ments for the force of the wind, rather than its direction. As he put it both
in his Explanations and Sailing Directions to accompany the Wind and Current
Charts (1859) and in his Physical Geography of the Sea and its Meteorology (1860):
‘‘Professor Buys Ballot has discovered, practically, the numerical relation
between the force of the wind and given barometric differences for certain
places in Holland.’’65
Two factors may help to account for Maury’s support. Firstly, the Dutch
were by far the greatest foreign contributor to his Wind and Current Charts.66
Secondly, Maury still hoped to expand his meteorological network by includ-
ing land-based observations. He had tried to utilize the weather reporting
network founded by Joseph Henry in 1849, under the authority of the recently
established Smithsonian Institution. However, Henry denied Maury access to
63. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 9 Apr 1860, KNMI, Box 682.
64. Locher, Le savant (ref. 40), 56.
65.M. F. Maury, Explanations and Sailing Directions to accompany the Wind and Current Charts,
8th ed., vol. 2 (Washington: Cornelius Wendell, 1859), 453; M. F. Maury, The Physical Geography of
the Sea and its Meteorology, 8th ed. (London: Sampson Low, Son & Co, 1860), 430–31.
66. Scott D. Woodruff et al., ‘‘Early Ship Observational Data and Icoads,’’ Climatic Change 73
(2005): 169–94, on 170.
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his database, because of the latter’s poor scientiﬁc qualiﬁcations and the
allegedly speculative nature of his publications.67 In the late 1850s, Maury
attempted to organize a second international conference that would also
include land measurements. However, his efforts were to no avail.68
The only promising solution in this regard came from his correspondence
with Buys Ballot. The wind rule had kindled Maury’s interest, and he was
encouraged to verify its validity in the United States. He used his connection
with the Dutch professor to gain support for the establishment of his own
network of land observations that could eventually serve as the foundation for
an American system of storm warnings.69
In May 1858, a petition was presented to the U.S. Senate requesting funding
for a project ‘‘to ascertain whether Professor Ballot’s rule by which the
approach of storms may be foretold is applicable to the [area of the great]
lakes.’’70 In December of that year, the senate voted against the petition. It did,
however, authorize the Secretary of War ‘‘to provide for taking meteorological
observations at the military stations and other points in the interior of the
continent, and for giving notice on the northern lakes and seaboard of the
approach and force of storms.’’71 Like the French, the Americans put more
conﬁdence in reporting about actual storms than in providing storm predictions.
Buys Ballot regarded Maury’s support for his rule as a mixed blessing. As
much as he welcomed any support, Maury’s lack of scientiﬁc credentials and
the careless way in which he expressed himself endangered Buy Ballot’s rep-
utation as a man of science. In a letter to the Belgian astronomer, Quetelet, he
toned down the claims of discovery that Maury attributed to him. He con-
fessed that he had not made progress in foretelling the emergence of strong
67. Katharine Anderson, ‘‘Mapping Meteorology,’’ in Intimate Universality. Local and Global
Themes in the History of Weather and Climate, ed. J. R. Fleming, V. Jankovic, and D. R. Coen
(Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2006), 69–91, on 75.
68. Matthew Maury to Adolphe Quetelet, 12 Dec 1853, CAQ, Collection 1761; Adolphe
Quetelet to Matthew Maury, 27 Feb and 7 Aug 1857, RNO, LR, Box 19; 17May and 26 Jun 1860,
Box 26; 3 Oct 1860, Box 27; Marin Jansen to Matthew Maury, 8 Mar 1854, RNO, LR, Box 13; 20
Aug 1858, Box 21.
69. Maury, Explanations (ref. 65), 453; Maury, Physical Geography (ref. 65), 430–31. Robert
Hatton to Matthew Maury, 3 Mar 1858, RNO, LR, Box 20. Hatton wrote to Maury: ‘‘I have just
read, in the intelligences your communication on the subject of the application of Prof. Buys
Ballot’s alleged meteorological discovery, to the navigation of our lakes.’’
70. Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 35th Cong., 1st sess., 6 May 1858, 421.
In June 1859, Buys Ballot was still under the impression that the senate was considering the
petition. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 3 Jun 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
71. Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., 22Dec 1858, 1127.
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winds with the degree of certainty that Maury claimed. He distanced himself
from Maury’s exaggerated style of writing and argued that he ‘‘always re-
main[ed] cautious not to state more than [he could] demonstrate.’’72
Buys Ballot preferred the approbation of his fellow professors, especially of
the leading authority at the time, Heinrich Dove in Berlin. In 1860, he offered
a paper on his wind rule to the Berlin-based journal, Annalen der Physik, in
which he had published several earlier papers. Unfortunately, and much to his
surprise, his contribution was rejected by the editor, Johann Christian Pog-
gendorff, a close colleague of Dove.73 The wind rule happened to rival Dove’s
own law of winds, and Buys Ballot cast doubts on the latter’s validity. In turn,
Dove adopted a critical attitude toward Buys Ballot’s wind rule. There can be
little doubt that this was the main reason behind Poggendorff’s otherwise
surprising step.74
Three years later, in 1863, nearly ten years after the Brussels conference,
Dove organized a conference on land meteorology at the annual meeting of the
Swiss Naturforscher Verein in Geneva. He invited leading meteorologists from
several countries including Austria, Italy, Spain, and France. This seemed
a perfect opportunity for Buys Ballot to make his wind rule more widely
known among his fellow researchers and so he eagerly accepted the invitation.
Unfortunately, he was among the very few meteorologists to do so and the
conference failed to acquire an international character, leaving Buys Ballot dis-
appointed at the absence of several savants whom he had wished to consult.75
Of all foreign countries, England was in a practical sense the most relevant
to Buys Ballot. As weather systems tend to move from west to east across the
Atlantic toward Europe, he set great store by the exchange of simultaneous
barometric observations with the British stations. Access to these data would
also enable him to test his rule across a wider area and issue warnings at Dutch
72. Buys Ballot to Adolphe Quetelet, 30 Jul 1860, CAQ, Collection 561. Quotation in original
language: ‘‘Vous verrez que je ne suis pas encore autant avance´ dans la pre´diction des vents forts
que M. Maury m’a fait l’honneur dans sa lettre adresse´e a` vous. . . . Je n’ai pas e´crit de cette
manie`re a` M. Maury, car j’ai toujours soin de ne plus afﬁrmer que je ne puisse de´montrer.’’
73. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘Beitra¨ge zur Vorhersage von Witterungserscheinungen, namentlich
von Windrichtung und Windkraft,’’ Archiv fu¨r die Holla¨ndischen Beitra¨ge zur Natur- und
Heilkunde 3 (1864): 85–99, on 95.
74. Anders O. Persson, ‘‘Hadley’s principle: Understanding and Misunderstanding the Trade
Winds,’’ History of Meteorology 3 (2006): 17–42, on 29.
75. Robert Henry Scott, ‘‘The international Meteorological Committee,’’ Nature 66 (1902):
608–09; C.H.D. Buys Ballot, Suggestions on a Uniform System of Meteorological Observations
(Utrecht: The Industry, 1872), 1–2.
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ports even further in advance. Before the Dutch storm warning system was
established, he had indeed requested the Minister of the Interior to bring his
wind rule to the attention of the British Board of Admiralty.76 Because of the
advantageous geographical location of these stations, Le Verrier was interested
in the British observations as well.
However, Buys Ballot received no response from England despite his fre-
quent attempts to inform the Meteorological Department and the Royal Soci-
ety about his method.77 In August 1863, an opportunity availed itself to make
his wind rule known to a scientiﬁc audience at the annual meeting of the
British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) held at Newcastle.
At this meeting Buys Ballot explained his system of forecasting based on his
many years of making observations in the Netherlands and most of all on his
wind rule:
More accurately, . . . the wind will be at nearly right angles with the direction
of the greatest difference of pressures. When you place yourself in the
direction of the wind, . . . you will have at your left the least atmospheric
pressure. . . .When the difference of pressure of the southern places above
the northern is not above four millimetres, there will be no wind of a force
above 30 lbs. on the square metre. [A]t the places [of the greatest difference
of observed pressures], there also the force of the wind will be generally
stronger.78
He also felt emboldened to add a few rules for the prediction of the amount of
rainfall and the appearance of thunder. His conﬁdence was partly fed by
a favorable paper of a merchant shipper, who compared Buys Ballot’s observa-
tions and signals with those of Fitzroy, and who had tested both against the
actual state of the weather for seven months from August 1861. Buys Ballot’s
predictions based on four stations were as accurate as Fitzroy’s, who received
observations from twenty stations.79
76. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 12 Nov and 27 Dec 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
77. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 3 Jun 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
78. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘On the System of Forecasting the Weather pursued in Holland,’’ in
Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science
(London: John Murray, 1864), 20–21.
79. F. H. Klein, C.H.D. Buys Ballot, and A. Adriani, The foretelling of the weather in con-
nection with meteorological observations by F.H. Klein together with a description of the telegraphic
warning system introduced in The Netherlands, June, 1860, as proposed by the director of the Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute Professor Dr. Buys-Ballot (London: Benjamin Pardon, 1863),
25–29.
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One can well imagine that Buys Ballot should wish to engage in some form
of discussion with Fitzroy. In the midst of widespread skepticism about fore-
casting, both men had developed a method for storm predictions and had
established a warning system in their countries. Yet, strangely enough, no
traces of correspondence are to be found between Fitzroy and Buys Ballot.
Although the latter frequently mentioned Fitzroy’s name in his letters, and
constantly strove to draw the attention of several British institutes to his
warning system, the two men never seem to have come into contact with one
another.80 Tellingly, Fitzroy did not mention Buys Ballot’s wind rule in any of
his publications.
To understand the cold shoulder received by the Dutchman, we need to take
a closer look at the events that took place at the British Meteorological Depart-
ment in the period 1860–1870. These events will also make it clear how Buys
Ballot’s wind rule, which initially served as a method for storm warnings in the
Netherlands, was transformed into a scientiﬁc principle enabling weather pre-
dictions in general, and eventually came to be accepted as a law of nature.
THE BRITISH METEOROLOGICAL DEPARTMENT
In 1863, the same year when Buys Ballot visited the annual BAAS meeting in
Britain, Fitzroy published a book on his latest theories of atmospheric circu-
lation. He had supervised the British Meteorological Department for almost
a decade and felt it was time to explain his method of forecasting in a work
entitled The Weather Book.81 The British storm warning service had come into
operation in February 1861, following the Dutch system by nine months. With
Fitzroy directing the warning system, the department had outgrown its original
tasks.
Ofﬁcially the department was commissioned (1) to supply instruments,
instructions, and registers to Mercantile Marine and Navy ships, and (2) to
compile statistical records from the completed registers of marine meteorolog-
ical observations.82 Once the compilation of marine data had become routine,
Fitzroy turned to other projects. He designed a barometer and wrote a manual
for its use. He began a practice of loaning barometers to ﬁshing villages along
80. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 3 Jun, 12Nov, and 27Dec 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
81. Robert Fitzroy, The Weather Book: A Manual of Practical Meteorology, 2nd ed. (London:
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1863), 172.
82. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 32.
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the British coasts. He made adjustments to Maury’s abstract log for oceanic
data in what he thought was a form more suitable for mariners. In addition
he devised new diagrams named ‘‘wind stars’’ to help seafarers understand
Maury’s wind charts more easily.83
Fitzroy’s activities beyond his ofﬁcial brief brought him into conﬂict with
the director of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, Frederick W.
Beechey (1796–1856).84 When the latter died, Fitzroy applied for the vacancy in
1857. Unfortunately, he was passed over for the post. Instead the position was
ﬁlled by his former junior ofﬁcer, Bartholomew Sulivan (1810–1890), who had
a brilliant record from the Crimean War. Yet out of respect for his former
commander, Sulivan kept his overall control of the Meteorological Depart-
ment to a minimum, leaving Fitzroy’s hands free to pursue his own program.85
In 1857, Fitzroy began constructing synoptic charts based on simultaneous
meteorological observations that he received from coastal stations. He hoped
to use these charts to understand the movement of atmospheric disturbances
over the British Isles. His ultimate aim was to establish a system of storm
warnings with the use of the electric telegraph. In the same year, a standard
work on the nature of storms was published by Heinrich Dove. Fitzroy could
not wait to read U¨ber das Gesetz der Stu¨rme and pressed for a translation. He
anticipated that Dove’s theories might provide an explanation of the weather
patterns that he could not understand by looking at his charts. The translation
was eventually carried out in 1862 by Robert Henry Scott (1833–1916), who had
been a student of Dove’s in Berlin.86
In the meanwhile, Fitzroy lobbied for a telegraphic warning system and
found support at the annual meeting of the British Association in Aberdeen.
Herschel, the great scientiﬁc authority of the time, backed the idea of com-
municating the progress of an actual storm by means of the telegraph. The
devastating storm of October 1859, which wrecked the iron-clad ocean steamer,
the Royal Charter, as it tried to reach Liverpool at the end of a voyage from
Australia, immediately gave a sense of urgency to Fitzroy’s proposal. On June
6, 1860, the President of the Board of Trade authorized the Meteorological
Department to prepare a system of storm warnings, which was operational by
February 1861.87
83. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 109–10.
84. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 91, 105.
85. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 108.
86. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 113; Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 35.
87. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 41–44.
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Fitzroy’s warning service was based on several elements, including changes
in barometric readings and indications of strong winds along the path of an
actual storm, and integrated Dove’s theories of middle latitude circulation of
air masses consisting of a northerly cold and dry air stream and a southwesterly
warm and moist air current. Storms resulted from the conﬂict between these
air currents.88 To decide whether to issue a storm warning, Fitzroy made
forecasts for separate districts based on the observations that were carried out
at thirteen stations around Britain. In addition Fitzroy received a report of six
observations from the continent by Le Verrier, whose storm warning scheme
still had not been approved by his government. Fitzroy sent ﬁve British
observations to Paris in return.89
The observations gave Fitzroy an idea of the expected surface winds. When
storms were likely to occur, he sent a telegram to the observation station in
question. The message contained a list of places with the words ‘‘North Cone’’
or ‘‘South Cone,’’ as indications of a storm from a northerly or southerly
direction, and ‘‘Drum,’’ indicating cyclonic or veering winds. On receipt of
the message by the station clerk, a signal was hoisted on a staff that was visible
to sailors from all directions.90 The Secretary to the Admiralty authorized the
cautionary signals for a one-year experiment as long as Fitzroy took on the
responsibility for them.91
In August 1861, Fitzroy exceeded his brief by issuing forty-eight-hour
weather forecasts to several daily newspapers. He saw no harm in publishing
routine forecasts as he had already made them to decide whether storm warn-
ings were necessary. They were thought useful for the general public, and
added hardly any cost to the warning system anyway.92
There was broad support for Fitzroy’s warning system from the seafaring
community, which made ample use of the warnings. When the secretary of the
Board of Trade, Thomas H. Farrer, expressed his concern about the rising
costs of the department and asked the council of the Royal Society its
opinion about warnings and forecasts, the Society responded by quoting
Herschel, who had been a supporter of telegraphic warnings. As far as fore-
casts were concerned, the Society found the query irrelevant on the grounds
88. Ibid., 35; Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 89.
89. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 43.
90. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 112–14.
91. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 173.
92. Ibid., 176–77.
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that the warnings involved no extra cost.93 However, the forecasting service
began to generate strong criticism from many sides. According to Fitzroy,
ship owners were critical of his forecasts because of loss of revenue when their
captains refused to set sail after a warning had been given.94 Then there were
those who had no conﬁdence in Fitzroy’s scientiﬁc method.95
In 1863, Fitzroy felt it necessary to justify his method to a broader audience
in The Weather Book. Much depended on the reception of this work. Fitzroy,
who lacked formal scientiﬁc training, hoped that the book would demonstrate
his skills as an experienced practitioner and someone who had mastered the
theories of Heinrich Dove. He explained the nature of storms in middle
latitudes according to Dove’s collision of polar and equatorial air currents.
He also described the gyratory movement of the storm as the result of currents
displacing each other around a point of low pressure. Furthermore, he pro-
posed a new principle that he claimed had resulted from years of observations.
His investigations had led him to believe that ‘‘the entire mass of atmosphere in
[the middle] latitude, has a constant, a perennial movement toward the
east. . . . ’’96
This proposition actually refers to the geostrophic wind, a ﬂow of air that
blows in the northern hemisphere with lower pressure to its left and higher
pressure to its right. Although Fitzroy was close to arriving at a general rule, the
proposition lacked the simplicity and practicability of Buys Ballot’s wind rule.
In addition to his claims, Fitzroy offered a controversial explanation for atmo-
spheric circulation. In a separate chapter in The Weather Book, he explained
how air masses seemed to behave like tides in the ocean following a cyclic
pattern under inﬂuence of the effect of the moon and the sun. He named this
the ‘‘lunisolar’’ effect.97
Fitzroy had high hopes that his lunisolar theory would ﬁnd favor with
gentlemen scientists and would become the guiding theory of atmospheric
circulation. In fact, the year 1863 was a record year for meteorological theories.
Fitzroy, who is likely to have been well informed of the latest developments in
the ﬁeld, had probably struggled to have his book ready for publication before
the end of the year. As mentioned earlier, Buys Ballot presented his wind rule
93. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 50, 251 (note 156); Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12),
122–23.
94. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 175.
95. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 49.
96. Fitzroy, Weather Book (ref. 81), 107, 173.
97. Ibid., 206, 244–56.
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to the British Association in the summer of 1863. Another contender, Francis
Galton, Charles Darwin’s nephew, published a work entitledMeteorographica.
This book, which presented the results of Galton’s survey of weather
observations, contained a series of maps depicting the state of the weather over
Europe for the whole month of December 1861. Unlike Fitzroy, who had
strong objections to the use of isobars on maps, Galton’s maps presented
isobarometric curves connecting areas of equal pressure. Fitzroy questioned
the accurateness of these lines because there were insufﬁcient points of mea-
surement.98 Yet Galton actually made a discovery by the use of isobars. Besides
centers of low pressure with winds spiralling inward, or cyclones, as they were
called, his maps revealed centers of high pressure. They showed winds blowing
outward, away from these high-pressure areas in a clockwise direction. He
named these areas anti-cyclones.99
Compared to Fitzroy’s lunisolar theory and Galton’s theory of atmospheric
circulation, Buys Ballot’s rules were far more appropriate for storm warnings.
The rules, which had been obtained empirically by observations carried out
over a long period of time, described the movement of atmospheric systems in
an efﬁcient way. At the same time, they indicated the direction and the force of
expected winds, the combination of which made them particularly useful for
storm warnings. Furthermore, they required no difﬁcult calculations, and they
could therefore be applied simply and quickly.
In 1863, Fitzroy faced other challenges besides dealing with competing
theories. James Glaisher, the secretary of the British Meteorological Society,
announced his intention to establish the Daily Weather Map Company, a ven-
ture with the objective of making a proﬁt from the publication of weather
maps.100 Although the undertaking failed, it must have had an impact on
Fitzroy’s performance at the Meteorological Department. There were obvi-
ously others, perhaps even with better qualiﬁcations, who wished to or could
take over his job.
In addition, Fitzroy’s one-year trial of storm warnings was evaluated by the
Wreck Department of the Board of Trade. His duties were also discussed in
the House of Commons. The rising costs of the department, which were
mainly caused by the growing number of logbooks that needed to be processed
98. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 187–88.
99. Francis Galton, Meteorographica: or Methods of Mapping the Weather (London: Mac-
Millan, 1863), 7.
100. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 98.
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and the use of the telegraph for the warnings, were a matter of debate in
parliament.101 With so much tension and deteriorating health to cope with,
Fitzroy needed a break. He put all his hopes on the reception of his Weather
Book. However, he received a devastating critique from John Herschel, the one
person whose opinion meant most to Fitzroy.102 In the following months he
was tormented by other, personal problems. In April 1865, he committed
suicide.103
AN INVESTIGATION, THE ORDEAL, AND A NEW OFFICE
Fitzroy’s tragic death has been the subject of different historical interpretations.
It has been related to his mental health, religious views, ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
and scientiﬁc work.104 Whatever the main cause, it came as a blow to the
authorities under whose guidance his job description as head of the Meteoro-
logical Department had been outlined in the ﬁrst place. As Katharine Ander-
son argues, in contemporary Victorian society Fitzroy’s suicide was attributed
in the ﬁrst place to his controversial forecasting work. In the press he was
portrayed as a ‘‘gentleman fraud’’ who could not cope with the morality and
the responsibility that were considered appropriate for science. Fitzroy was
guilty of the three deadly sins of ‘‘practical science, popular prophecy, and
suicide.’’ By committing these, he had compromised his integrity and had
discredited the scientiﬁc claims of the Meteorological Department.105
In the months following Fitzroy’s death, his former assistant Thomas
Babington took over his duties until matters were settled. This temporary
solution was suggested by the Royal Society in response to an inquiry by the
Board of Trade.106 However, a more fundamental decision regarding the
101. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, HC Deb 12 May 1864, vol. 175, cols. 401–02.
102. J. M. Walker, History of the Meteorological Ofﬁce (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 50; Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 199–200.
103. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 119–20.
104. Ibid., 120; Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 53–54.
105. Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 120–23; see, for instance, R. I. Murchison,
‘‘Anniversary Address,’’ The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 35 (1865): cviii–clxxxvii, on
cxxxi.
106. In response to Thomas H. Farrer’s letter, Sabine, the president of the Royal Society,
recommended that storm warnings be continued. As far as regular forecasts were concerned, the
President and the Council of the Royal Society ‘‘decline[d] expressing any opinion.’’ Quoted in
‘‘Correspondence between the Board of Trade and the Royal Society in Reference to the
Meteorological Department,’’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 14 (1865): 306–17, on 316.
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future of the department had to be made. Therefore, the Board of Trade
pressed for a committee to investigate the management and the affairs of the
department. The Royal Society nominated Galton as chairman of the com-
mittee.107 The other two supervising institutes, viz. the Board of Trade and the
Admiralty, nominated secretary Thomas H. Farrer and Staff Commander
Frederick J. Evans, respectively.
The report of the Galton Committee was presented to Parliament on April
13, 1866. The outcome of the investigation was a dismissal of Fitzroy’s method
of forecasting. The committee considered his method too individualistic and
empirical. The daily forecasts were made ‘‘provisionally [without making]
notes or calculations.’’108 The observations and the preparation of charts were
‘‘not carried on by precise rules; and [were] not established by a sufﬁcient
induction from observed facts.’’109 Neither was the method ‘‘capable of being
stated in the form of Rules or Laws.’’110 As such, the committee opted for the
termination of regular forecasts on the grounds that there was ‘‘no scientiﬁc
basis’’ for them.111 The storm warnings, however, were thought ‘‘too impor-
tant, too popular, and too full of promise of practical utility’’ to be ended.
Instead, the committee suggested to retain them in a modiﬁed form.112
As for the future of meteorological research, the committee recommended
to split the Department into two separate branches, one governmental ofﬁce
for the distribution of instruments and the collection of observations, and
another scientiﬁc branch for the reduction and tabulation of ﬁgures. In addi-
tion, the committee decided that the work of the department should be carried
out ‘‘under the direction of a scientiﬁc body’’ instead of a government depart-
ment. Therefore it advised that the Royal Society or the British Association
take over the management of the new Ofﬁce by the appointment of a com-
mittee.113 It also recommended an investigation into ‘‘the laws which govern
the changes of weather in the British Isles . . . [so] as to enable Meteorologists
to place the practice of foretelling weather on a sound basis.’’114
107. Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider Certain Questions Relating to the Meteoro-
logical Department of the Board of Trade [also known as Galton Report] (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1866), vii.
108. Ibid., 20.
109. Ibid., 42.
110. Ibid., 20; also quoted in Walker, History (ref. 102), 63.
111. Report of a Committee (ref. 107), 24.
112. Ibid., 38.
113. Ibid., 40.
114. Ibid., 37.
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Clearly the committee took the view that the time of uncontrolled forecast-
ing experiments was over. To prevent the public from ‘‘confus[ing] real knowl-
edge with ill founded pretences,’’ the committee decided that measures needed
to be taken to bring these risky activities under strict control by the members of
the scientiﬁc community. A division of labor into two branches of meteorology
would make a clear distinction between what was considered practical work
such as collecting data, and scientiﬁc procedures such as reducing and analyz-
ing these data. The report of the Galton committee was distributed across
Europe and reached Buys Ballot in the Netherlands. It must have been frus-
trating for him to read the piece, especially the claim that ‘‘no competent
meteorologist believe[d] the science to be . . . in such a state as to enable an
observer to indicate day by day the weather to be experienced for the next
48 hours.’’115 As has been shown, Buys Ballot had in fact formulated a ground
rule for foretelling weather changes in the Netherlands.
The ﬁnal remarks of the report in particular disturbed the Dutch professor.
Within two months after its publication, Buys Ballot wrote a slightly irritated
letter to the secretary of the British Association. He asked whether the com-
mittee was ‘‘right to say p. 43 that it was Admiral Fitzroy . . .who gave the ﬁrst
impulse to this branch of inquiry for foretelling, or forecasting storms, who
induced men of science and the public to take an interest in it? When a better
system has been introduced a year before in the Netherlands.’’116
Since 1859, Buys Ballot had frequently requested the Dutch Minister of the
Interior to inform the British of his warning service, because he thought that
the measures taken in Holland could be of use in Britain as well. He repeated
this message in the following years.117 In 1863, he visited England and gave
a lecture about his wind rule at the annual meeting of the British Association.
Two years later he wrote a paper for The Civil Engineer and Architect’s Jour-
nal.118 In his letter to the secretary of the British Association in 1866, he asked
why his wind rule was ‘‘not refuted’’ then, if the committee had found it
faulty.119 In the race to formulate a theory of weather systems, it seems that
no British scholar involved in the competitive ﬁeld of meteorology wished to
115. Ibid., 24.
116. Buys Ballot to the Secretary of the British Association, 3 Jun 1866, KNMI, Box 684.
117. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 12 Nov and 27 Dec 1859, KNMI, Box 682.
Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 16 Feb 1864, KNMI, Box 684.
118. C.H.D. Buys Ballot, ‘‘On Meteorological Observations as made in Holland,’’ The Civil
Engineer and Architect’s Journal 28 (1865): 245–46.
119. Buys Ballot to the Secretary of the British Association, 3 Jun 1866, KNMI (ref. 116).
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pay attention to a Dutch professor who claimed to have found a local wind
rule.
While Buys Ballot became more agitated, the British daily weather forecasts
stopped being issued as of June 1866.120 It looked as if the recommendations of
the Galton committee were being implemented. The following August, Buys
Ballot visited England again to give a lecture about his method of storm
prediction at the annual meeting of the British Association.121 He still believed
that his system could be of use in Britain. After all, the British system of storm
warnings was seen as lacking a sound basis and that was precisely what he could
provide.
Consequently, he travelled to Nottingham to convince the members of the
scientiﬁc community at the meeting of the British Association once again that
he had in fact found a sound basis for forecasting weather changes. There he
contacted Galton and, presumably, explained to him the principles on which
the Dutch system of warnings rested. In Buys Ballot’s own words, ‘‘I commu-
nicated a paper on the subject to the British Association at the Newcastle
meeting [1863], and I wonder that my system has not been adopted in England,
the more so because I recommended it to Mr. Francis Galton in August last
[1866].’’122 Buys Ballot was truly amazed that no one paid attention to his plea
to adopt the Dutch system in the United Kingdom.
It is hard to prove that Galton deliberately ignored Buys Ballot’s sugges-
tions. He may have had several reasons for not adopting Buys Ballot’s system of
storm warnings, but it is not implausible that the British ofﬁcial who was
involved in deciding the future of the Meteorological Department, wanted
a role for himself and to be the ﬁrst in Britain to provide a sound basis for the
cautionary signal system. In his book on meteorology, Meteorographica (1863),
he came very close to deﬁning a general rule for the direction of the winds.123
120. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 65; Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 229.
121. C.H.D. Buys-Ballot, ‘‘On the Method adopted at Utrecht in discussing Meteorological
Observations,’’ in Report of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science (London: John Murray, 1867), 16.
122. In a letter to the editor of the PLPSM, Buys Ballot wrote about his encounter with Francis
Galton. The greater part of the letter is cited in Buys Ballot, ‘‘On Storm Warnings,’’ PLPSM 6
(1867): 83–84.
123. Galton’s isobarometric maps showed the following ‘‘universal fact . . . throughout the
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Yet, to be able to give storm warnings, one has to forecast the force of the winds
as well.
Finally, on October 27, 1866, the Royal Society came with an ofﬁcial reply
to the report of the Galton committee. Most of the proposals were adopted.
The council endorsed the plan to split the Meteorological Department into
two separate branches for the collection and the reduction of data. It also
supported the proposal to have the duties of the ﬁrst branch performed by
a governmental ofﬁce, while it considered it best that the other branch was
placed under the supervision of a scientiﬁc committee. The council, however,
disagreed with the Galton committee on the subject of storm warnings. On
this issue it stated:
[T]he President and Committee do not concur in the recommendations that
the issue of storm warnings should be placed under the superintendence of
the scientiﬁc body under whose direction the meteorological observations
are discussed. At present these warnings are founded on rules mainly
empirical. In a few years they may probably be much improved by deduc-
tions from the observations in land meteorology, which will by that time
have been collected and studied. The empirical character may thus be ex-
pected to give way to one more strictly scientiﬁc, in which case the man-
agement of storm warnings might be ﬁtly undertaken by a strictly scientiﬁc
body. It must not be forgotten that storm warnings did not originate in any
recommendation of the Royal Society. If their present continuance be
deemed of sufﬁcient importance by the Government, it must be for them to
consider the means of carrying them on.124
With this statement the Royal Society ﬁnally made explicit its stance on
forecasts and warnings. The council advised against the continuance of fore-
casts as well as storm warnings under its direction. If the British government
wanted a weather service, it should take it on. When asked to give its opinion
in the past, the Royal Society had only responded in the most cryptic terms.
Moreover, it had turned a blind eye to Fitzroy’s activities, which often went
beyond his assigned duties. However, in the aftermath of the admiral’s death,
the Royal Society declined to take responsibility for the issue of storm warn-
ings, which the council essentially saw as a public service. Since the Galton
committee had decided that the warnings lacked a sound scientiﬁc basis, the
Society distanced itself from the entire issue. It rather supported the idea of
124. Report of the Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society, For the Year ending 31st
December 1867 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1868), 57.
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reshaping the Meteorological Department as a center for the collection and
analysis of meteorological data. No more and no less.
With this decision the issue of warnings came to a sudden end on December
7, 1866. The telegraph agents who received the warning messages were barely
informed of the termination of the service. On that same day Babington, who
had remained loyal to Fitzroy since the establishment of the ofﬁce, resigned.125
On January 21, 1867, the Meteorological Department was reorganized and
renamed as the Meteorological Ofﬁce. Just as the Galton committee had
recommended, the ofﬁce was divided into two branches. Captain Henry
Toynbee was appointed head of the marine branch and became responsible
for the distribution of instruments and the collection of marine observations.
Balfour Stewart, the director of Kew Observatory, where land observations
were taken, was appointed head of the ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ branch and secretary to the
scientiﬁc committee, which oversaw its activities. He became responsible for
the calibration of instruments and the reduction and analysis of the observa-
tions. Robert Henry Scott was appointed director of the Meteorological Ofﬁce
in overall charge of both branches.126
Not surprisingly, the president of the Royal Society, Edward Sabine (1788–
1883), was very careful in his choice of the new director. To avoid the repercus-
sions of the previous choice, he preferred a clerkish superintendence rather
than an obstinate and enterprising personality like Fitzroy. Although Scott had
a degree in physics and had studied under Dove in Berlin, he had no experi-
ence in meteorology. Except for the translation of Dove’s works, he was devoid
of any scientiﬁc ambition, which could play an adverse role in his appoint-
ment.127 Besides, any change he might want to make in the program of the
Ofﬁce needed to be referred to the Royal Society Meteorological Committee,
of which Galton was a member and which was chaired by Sabine.128 Above all,
Scott was a close family friend of Sabine and his executor.129 In every respect,
Scott was the perfect candidate. On February 7, 1867, he took ofﬁce.
125. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 67, 83. The circular issued by the Board of Trade which
announced the suspension of the warning service had just appeared on 29 Nov 1866; ‘‘Circular of
the Board of Trade,’’ 29 Nov 1866, KNMI, Box 685.
126. Report of the Meteorological Committee (ref. 124), 5–6.
127. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 71–72.
128. Report of the Meteorological Committee (ref. 124), 5.
129. Walker, History (ref. 102), 72.
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BREAKING THROUGH THE IMPASSE
At the start of 1867, the crisis over the future of the Meteorological Department
appeared to have been resolved by the ﬁnal decision of the Royal Society. Yet,
what the Society had not anticipated was a storm of protest that resulted after
the discontinuance of the warning service. The protesters were of diverse
backgrounds. Ship owners and seamen argued that Fitzroy’s cautionary warn-
ings had worked well and helped save lives, whether scientiﬁc or not. Under-
writers, marine boards, and chambers of commerce were supporters of the
warning service because of its commercial value.130 Some men of science
likewise denounced the cancellation of warnings.
Most scathing in his criticism was the naturalist and politician William
Henry Sykes, member of the Royal Society, Member of Parliament, and
former president of the Royal Statistical Society. He vigorously campaigned
for the resumption of the storm warning service, both in the House of Com-
mons and at the 1867 meeting of the British Association. There he dismissed
the arguments employed by the Meteorological Committee, for example, that
Fitzroy had based his conclusions ‘‘mainly on empirical data’’ as ‘‘a pedantic
affectation of science.’’ The Committee, he sneered, proposed the establish-
ment of several additional observatories so that at the end of ﬁfteen years it
‘‘expected to be able to predict storms on philosophical data, not on empirical
data.’’131
The journal of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society became
one of the hotbeds of criticism. The secretary of the society, Joseph Baxendell,
stated:
[T]he recommendation of the President and Council of the Royal Society, . . .
is a retrograde movement, opposed to the true interests of the science of
meteorology, and likely, if acted upon, to retard its progress. It is therefore to
be hoped that the Board of Trade will reconsider their decision, and not . . .
discontinue a system which, on grounds of humanity and commercial
economy, has met with the general approval of the country, and is, more-
over, so likely to contribute materially to the advancement of a popular and
highly-important branch of science.132
130. Halford, Storm Warning (ref. 54), 233–34; Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref. 12), 128.
131. Walker, History (ref. 102), 83–84.
132. Joseph Baxendell, ‘‘On the Recent Suspension, by the Board of Trade, of Cautionary
Storm Warnings,’’ PLPSM 6 (1867): 41–48, on 45.
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It is striking that Buys Ballot also found his way into the journal. He wrote
a letter to the editor and explained once again that he had established a system
of warnings grounded on an empirical rule: ‘‘It is a fact above all doubt that the
wind that comes is nearly at right angles to the line between the places of
highest and lowest barometer readings. The wind has the place of lowest height
at its left hand.’’133 He went on to emphasize that the Dutch warning service
preceded Fitzroy’s by nine months. But, he argued, ‘‘It is not only a right of
priority that I claim; . . . I think my system is much better.’’134 He explained
that he had contacted Galton to inform him about his system in August of the
previous year, and that he had received no response. Therefore, he invited
British meteorologists to visit Utrecht and see for themselves how the system
worked.135
The letter shows Buys Ballot’s persistence in making his system known to
the British public. Yet, it is also remarkable to observe how the Royal Society’s
stance toward the issue of storm warnings—that it could only be continued
when it was placed on ‘‘a strictly scientiﬁc’’ footing136—had affected Buys
Ballot’s warning system in the Netherlands. In the last part of the letter, Buys
Ballot announced that he was about to introduce a new instrument to the
Dutch system. He had devised what he called an aeroclinoscope, an apparatus
with a movable arm that indicated the greatest difference in barometrical
measurements taken at northern and southern stations in the Netherlands.
By launching this instrument, Buys Ballot presumably sought to give his
warning system a more scientiﬁc character in order to win the approval of the
Royal Society or the British Association. Moreover, he was careful not to end
up in the same pitfall as Fitzroy. Since the crisis over their continuation in
Britain had begun, he had become reluctant to issue ofﬁcial warnings.137 What
better way to give warnings than by an instrument that allowed the public to
decide for themselves whether or when a gale was coming? It should be said,
however, that the aeroclinoscope could hardly be called an instrument, as it
was not a measuring device.138 Nevertheless, through this ‘‘instrument’’ Buys
133. Buys Ballot, ‘‘On Storm Warnings’’ (ref. 122), 83.
134. Ibid., 83.
135. Ibid., 83–84.
136. Report of the Meteorological Committee (ref. 124), 57.
137. C.H.D. Buys Ballot to the Minister of the Interior, 8 May 1867, KNMI, Box 685.
138. At ﬁrst glance the launching of the aeroclinoscope could be seen as an example of the
nineteenth-century ideal of letting ‘‘nature speak for itself.’’ However, unlike self-registering
instruments, the aeroclinoscope was not a measuring but a signaling apparatus. After receiving
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Ballot could provide weather information without putting himself at risk of
being held responsible for the accuracy of the warnings.
In a letter to the Dutch Minister of the Interior, Buys Ballot wrote, ‘‘I knew
that human nature would be inclined, despite warnings against it and despite
having been warned against it by Admiral Fitzroy, to view a cautionary sign as
a prediction. People would decide and people have decided: a sign, therefore
a storm, no sign, therefore no storm. They refrained from investigating the
course of deviations. They were satisﬁed with: it has not proved correct,
without ﬁnding out in what case it has not come true.’’139
It seems that Buys Ballot’s letter to the editor of the journal of the Manchester
Literary and Philosophical Society speeded things up at last. In less than two
weeks, John Herschel, whose attention had been attracted by the letter, sent
a reply to the journal. He explained how in 1863, he had come across a phenom-
enon that is typical of November gales in Britain. He had observed that the
direction of the wind was always perpendicular to that of advancing hurricanes
that accompany the ‘‘great November wave.’’140 When reading Buys Ballot’s
letter, it had struck him that the Dutch meteorologist wrote about the same
phenomenon in general terms. He concluded from the letter that this was ‘‘no
special peculiarity of the November gales [as he assumed], but a general one.’’141
He further wondered whether Buys Ballot’s wind rule, or ‘‘feature’’ as he referred
to it, applied to the southern hemisphere aswell, but in the reverse direction (!).142
The reply generated an exchange of letters between Herschel and Buys
Ballot.143 A French naval captain, named Bourgois, incidentally got involved
-
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in the discussion when reading a translation of the open letters in a French
weekly journal.144 Bourgois, who investigated the daily weather reports of the
French observatory, veriﬁed the wind rule empirically. Although he added
nothing new to the rule, his contribution to the discussion is noteworthy, for
he combined Buys Ballot’s principle and Galton’s cyclones and anti-cyclones
in a comprehensible account.145
Also, Bourgois went one step further than Herschel in generalizing Buys
Ballot’s rule. Whereas Herschel referred to the wind rule as a ‘‘general feature,’’
Bourgois deﬁned it as a ‘‘law of nature.’’146 This seems to be the ﬁrst instance
of Buys Ballot’s wind rule being attributed the status of a law. No matter how
gratifying such an evaluation was for the Dutch professor, he still hoped to win
acceptance from his learned colleagues, for his warning service had already
earned the support of naval and commercial shipping.147
Pleased by these developments, Buys Ballot sent a reply to the editor of the
French Revue Maritime and suggested how the rotation of the earth caused the
winds in the northern hemisphere to blow clockwise around the center of
a low-pressure area and anti-clockwise around the center of a high-pressure
area. He also described the reverse phenomenon in the southern hemisphere.
Despite his claim of having formulated a theory for the rotation of the wind,
Buys Ballot was still unable to explain the deﬂection of the wind to the east or
west of areas of low pressure. Apparently, he was not aware of the coriolis force
and he had made no progress since his 1860 brochure. Yet, he could not refrain
from pointing out again that it was ‘‘in the Netherlands, where . . . the rule
ha[d] been found.’’148
It is clear that Herschel’s approving reference to the wind rule was an
important factor in its dissemination in Britain. For years Buys Ballot had
tried to attract the attention of the British scientiﬁc community to his ﬁndings.
Although the rule was merely referred to as a ‘‘general feature,’’ Buys Ballot had
144. ‘‘Le vent et le barome`tre; lettres de Sir J. Herschel et de M. le capitaine de vaisseau
Bourgois,’’ Revue Maritime et coloniale 19 (1867): 927–29, on 927–28.
145. Ibid., 928–29.
146. Bourgeois wrote: ‘‘le fait signale´ par M. Buys-Ballot a` Sir J.W. Herschel, et que ce savant
me´te´orologiste anglais conside´rait, de`s l’anne´e 1863, comme un cas particulier d’une loi ge´ne´rale de
la nature [emphasis added], a plus de ge´ne´ralite´ encore qu’il ne semble le supposer.’’ Ibid., 928.
147. Klein et al., The foretelling (ref. 79), 15–16.
148. ‘‘[C]’est aux Pays-Bas qu’on en a trouve´ non-seulement la re`gle, et non pas d’une manie`re
simplement empirique, mais selon une the´orie conﬁrme´e depuis par l’expe´rience.’’ Buys Ballot to
Paul Dupont, editor of the Revue Maritime et Coloniale in Paris, 10 Apr 1867, KNMI, 685 Letter
book of letters sent, 1854–1889.
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ﬁnally found a receptive audience. Another factor that worked to the Dutch-
man’s advantage was the general wave of protests against the suspension of the
English warnings. The critique in the Proceedings of the Literary and Philosoph-
ical Society of Manchester took on a more accusatory form:
[N]o conﬁdence could . . . be placed in the so-called ‘‘Scientiﬁc Committee,’’
which [has] shown itself to be utterly regardless of public opinion and
feeling, and quite unﬁtted to carry out efﬁciently the duties which had been
so ably and so usefully discharged by the late Admiral Fitzroy. [The com-
mittee] has not hesitated to divert funds . . . to the furtherance of schemes
and scientiﬁc crotchets which are altogether uncalled for . . . and which, have
certainly no interest whatever for the general public.149
Halfway through 1867, even members of parliament complained about the
suspension of the public weather service. The president of the Board of Trade
(the Duke of Richmond), who furnished an annual sum for the warning
system, threatened to withdraw the allowance.150 Alarmed by this prospect, the
Royal Society Meteorological Committee had to make a quick decision. It had
landed itself in an awkward predicament. On the one hand, it refused to give
storm warnings, because the Royal Society found them scientiﬁcally unjustiﬁ-
able. On the other hand, the committee could not do without funding.
In the midst of public protests and under pressure from the president of the
Board of Trade, there seemed to be no way out for Scott, the director of the
Meteorological Ofﬁce, other than to restore the storm warnings. However,
how could the ofﬁce retain its credibility if the service were reinstated while
there was still no agreement on a method or a principle to place the storm
warnings on a ‘‘strictly scientiﬁc basis’’?
The Meteorological Ofﬁce chose a cautious approach. In July the ofﬁce
instituted an enquiry into the practice of storm warnings in other countries.
Replies were received from France, Holland, Austria, Italy, and Norway. This
time it was not Buys Ballot who responded, but one of his assistants, J. E.
Cornelissen. In a brief reply, he explained the theory behind the Dutch wind
rule, the warning procedure, and the use of the aeroclinoscope.151
Finding himself in a quandary, Scott was desperate to ﬁnd a basis for storm
warnings. In retrospect, the Dutch wind rule was precisely what he needed. In
149. Joseph Baxendell, ‘‘Storm Warnings,’’ PLPSM 6 (1867): 178–79.
150. Burton, ‘‘History’’ (ref. 41), 86.
151. J. E. Cornelissen to R. H. Scott, 12 Aug 1867, cited in Report of the Meteorological
Committee (ref. 124), 71–72.
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August he travelled to the Netherlands to visit the meteorological institute at
Utrecht to see for himself how the Dutch warning system operated.152 When
he returned to England, he started an investigation to test the correctness of the
wind rule. To this end he used old records of daily weather reports dating from
Fitzroy’s time and started collecting observations in October 1867.153
Meanwhile, under the weight of public criticism, the Meteorological Com-
mittee changed tack and ﬁnally agreed to provide, free of charge, telegraphic
information about storms already in progress to ports and ﬁshing villages in the
British Isles. Yet, instead of using the term ‘‘storm warnings,’’ the committee
referred to the practice as ‘‘intelligence of facts’’ or ‘‘notices of serious atmo-
spherical disturbances.’’154 Information about wind direction stopped being
issued, and therefore the cone disappeared from the storm warning arsenal.
Fitzroy’s drum was reintroduced, but was hoisted for a shorter period of
36 hours instead of 72.155
In May 1868, Scott presented his results to the Royal Society Meteorological
Committee. Buys Ballot’s rules had held reasonably well, if not perfectly so.
A difference of 0.6 inch in the barometer readings of two stations was followed
by a storm in 60 percent of cases, whereas more than 70 percent of all storms
were preceded by such differences. With regard to the direction of the wind,
the rule did even better. In more than 90 percent of the cases it was seen to
have correctly predicted the direction.156 Although Scott presented the inquiry
as ‘‘purely tentative,’’ he nevertheless interpreted his results as a ‘‘prima facie
conﬁrmation’’ of Buys Ballot’s work. Signiﬁcantly, throughout the paper he
consistently spoke of Buys Ballot’s rules as a ‘‘law.’’157 Moreover, he attributed
the law to Buys Ballot, although he was aware that others had made similar
suggestions before him. The main reason he credited the law to Buys Ballot was
152. R. H. Scott to J. E. Cornelissen, 24 Aug 1867, KNMI, Box 1463.
153. R. H. Scott, Report of an inquiry into the connexion between strong winds and barometrical
differences: presented to the Committee of the Meteorological Ofﬁce (London: Eyre and Spot-
tiswoode, 1869), 4.
154. Thomas Farrer issued a circular on 30 Nov 1867. Report of the Meteorological Committee
(ref. 124), 19.
155. Report of the Meteorological Committee (ref. 124), 19; Anderson, Predicting the Weather (ref.
12), 129.
156. Scott, however, did allow for an arc of 135 degrees with regard to the right direction so as
to allow of veering of the wind during 24 hours. Scott, Report of an inquiry (ref. 153), 7, 11, 15.
157. Ibid., 17. See also on page 3: ‘‘The Principle, which I shall call, throughout this Report,
the Law. . . . ’’
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because the latter had ‘‘been the person who has insisted on its importance as
a means of foretelling wind, both as to direction and force.’’158
Indeed, the way Scott rephrased the law, it was changed into a predictive
claim. At the same time, however, his phrasing ignored the force of the wind,
in contradiction to the title of his report:
If any morning there be a difference between the barometrical readings at
any two stations, such as Groningen and Maastricht, a wind will blow on
that day in the neighbourhood of the line joining those stations, which will
be inclined to that line at an angle of 90 or thereabouts, and will have the
station where the reading is lowest on its left-hand side.159
That same year, Scott also discussed ‘‘Buys Ballot’s law’’ on several other
occasions, among them his Friday lecture at the Royal Institution and in a small
booklet on the use of the barometer. His subordinate at the Meteorological
Ofﬁce, marine superintendent Henry Toynbee, followed suit by referring
consistently to ‘‘Buys Ballot’s law’’ in another non-ofﬁcial report for the Mete-
orological Committee on isobaric curves.160 More importantly, likewise did
the Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society in its ofﬁcial Report, For
the year ending 31st December 1868, which was presented to Parliament. The
report ended with: ‘‘[The] conclusions are very encouraging as general results,
inasmuch as they afford a very strong corroboration of the value of the law as
the foundation of a practical principle for the issue of cautionary telegrams.’’161
The explicit and consistent use of the term ‘‘law’’ by these parties was hardly
accidental. A law, rather than a rule of thumb, would provide the scientiﬁc
backing needed to legitimatize the practice of storm warnings. As we have seen,
the Galton report rejected Fitzroy’s method of weather forecasting for not
being based on meteorological laws, and advised the search for such laws so
as ‘‘to place the practice of foretelling weather on a sound basis.’’162 Precisely
158. Ibid., 4.
159. Ibid., 3.
160. R. H. Scott, ‘‘On theWork of the Meteorological Ofﬁce, Past and Present,’’Notices of the
Proceedings at the Meetings of the Members of the Royal Institution of Great Britain 5 (1866–1869):
535–47, on 542–43; H. Toynbee, Report to the Meteorological Committee of the Meteorological Ofﬁce
on the use of isobaric curves and a line of greatest barometric change in attempting to foretell winds;
with some practical suggestions for seamen and a few remarks on Buys Ballot’s law (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1869).
161. Report of the Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society, For the Year ending 31st
December 1868 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1869), 18.
162. Report of a Committee (ref. 107), 37.
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the fact that Buys Ballot’s set of rules lacked the exact nature of, say, Newton’s
law of gravitation reveals the strategic nature of the term.
During the following years, Buys Ballot’s law was tacitly introduced in the
British system of storm warnings, in spite of the previous announcement that
the new storm warnings would not have a predictive character, but would only
be based on the registration of existing storms. In this respect the situation
remained delicate. However, the reintroduction of the cone in the storm
warnings of the Meteorological Ofﬁce, which signalled the expected direction
of the wind,163 could be viewed as an indication that Buys Ballot’s predictive
rule was being used in the warning system. It was only in 1876, in a report of
the Meteorological Committee, that Scott openly discussed the principles on
which British storm warnings were based. At the top of the list was the ‘‘Law
known as Buys Ballot’s.’’ As Scott emphasized, ‘‘The intelligent application of
this principle to wind motion . . . has been the chief point in which modern
meteorology offers a contrast to prior investigations into the science.’’ He was,
however, quick to add that these principles were ‘‘only announced with very
great difﬁdence.’’164
After the acceptance of Buys Ballot’s wind rule as a natural law by the British
Meteorological Committee, the label ‘‘Buys Ballot’s law’’ rapidly gained wide
currency and appeared in a variety of European and American journals and
publications. Within a few years of the publication of the British Report,
French, Italian, and German versions of the expression could be encountered.165
163. Walker, History (ref. 102), 86.
164. Robert H. Scott quoted in ‘‘Report of the Meteorological Committee to the President
and Council of the Royal Society on the Work done in the Meteorological Ofﬁce since their
appointment in 1866 to December 31, 1875,’’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 24 (1876):
189–210, on 200.
165. The law appeared, for instance, as ‘‘Das Gesetz von Buys Ballot’’ in C. Jelinek, ‘‘U¨ber den
Zusammenhang zwischen Stu¨rmen und barometrischen Unterschieden,’’ Zeitschrift der O¨s-
terreichischen Gesellschaft fu¨r Meteorologie 4 (1869): 331–39, on 331; as ‘‘loi de Buys Ballot’’ in R. H.
Scott, ‘‘Institution Royale de la Grande Bretagne,’’ Revue des Cours Scientiﬁques de la France et de
l’E´tranger 6 (1868–1869): 595–601, on 599; as ‘‘die niederla¨ndische Regel von Buys-Ballot’’ in
a paper in the Prague-based journal by A. Nowak, ‘‘Dr. Prestel’s Windgesetz,’’ Lotos. Zeitschrift
fu¨r Naturwissenschaften 19 (1869): 153–61, on 155; as the ‘‘law of Buys Ballot’’ in Albert J. Myer,
‘‘The winds and their law,’’ Annual Reports of the Secretary of War 1 (Washington DC, 1871): 344–
47, on 345–46; as ‘‘Buys-Ballot’sche Gesetz’’ in Prestel, ‘‘Ergebnisse der Beobachtungen und
Erfahrungen betreffend die Sturmwarnungen und die Sturmsignale,’’ Jahresbericht der Natur-
forschenden Gesellschaft in Emden 58 (1873): 1–8, on 8; as ‘‘legge di Buys Ballot’’ in A. Gianjacopo,
‘‘Sul Clima di Mantova,’’ Atti e Memorie della Reale Accademia Virgiliana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti
(1874): 54–64, on 60; and as ‘‘ley de Buys Ballot’’ in P. Benitos Vin˜es, Apuntes relativos a los
Huracanes de las Antillas (n.p., 1877), 121.
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The earliest instances of these usually concerned translations of papers or bro-
chures by Scott, Toynbee, or the Secretary of the Scottish Meteorological Soci-
ety, Alexander Buchan. The rapid spread testiﬁes to the increase in interest in
both meteorology and storm warnings in several states. It also testiﬁes to the shift
in authority in this burgeoning ﬁeld from naval ofﬁcers to academic scientists,
who were far more eager for scientiﬁc foundations for their practices.166
This shift became markedly visible at the international meteorological con-
ference held at Vienna in 1873. Whereas the previous international conference
in Brussels had been dominated by naval ofﬁcers, the Vienna conference was
almost exclusively attended by academic scientists. With the canonization of
the law, Buys Ballot was ﬁrmly established as a meteorological authority. In
1873, he was unanimously chosen to preside over the Vienna conference, with
Scott acting as its secretary.167 In a ﬁeld as hotly contested as meteorology,
their mutual interests had resulted in a rare feat of symbiosis, crowned by a law
that still bears the name of its most vociferous prophet.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, Buys Ballot played a secondary role in the elevation of his
local rule to a global law. Despite his international orientation, expressed from
the very ﬁrst moment of the publication of his wind rule in the French Comptes
Rendus, he initially failed to gain foreign recognition for his discovery or to
induce others to verify his rule in other regions. Nor could he provide an
adequate theoretical foundation for his rule. Therefore, it remained unclear
whether the rule applied beyond the Dutch borders.
His fellow meteorologists did not recognize or ignored the importance of
the empirical generalization. Those who did support the rule were engaged in
naval and commercial shipping, and lacked the scientiﬁc authority that could
give weight to their opinion. Meteorology was fraught with conﬂicting con-
cerns and objectives. Views about what it should entail shifted back and forth
between those who saw it as a public resource concerned with practical results
such as storm predictions and those who regarded it as primarily a scientiﬁc
ﬁeld that aimed for general laws, a physics of the atmosphere. Moreover,
166. For the shift in authority in marine meteorology, see Azadeh Achbari, ‘‘Building Net-
works’’ (ref. 34) 257–82.
167. Report of the Proceedings of the Meteorological Congress at Vienna (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1874).
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members of the latter group were inclined to regard each other as competitors
rather than as collaborators.
In the course of the transformation of the wind rule into a law, Buys Ballot
did his utmost to interest several foreign parties in his Dutch ﬁndings. Yet,
eventually it was Scott who contributed to the general acceptance of Buys
Ballot’s wind law by claiming a veriﬁcation of the rule in the region encom-
passing the British Isles, by highlighting the role of Buys Ballot in its conception,
by stressing its utility in foretelling storms, and by a consistent use of the word
‘‘law.’’ The backing of the Royal Society, moreover, provided the required
authority for propagating these views abroad.168 At this point scientiﬁc interests
and practical considerations converged under the pressure of public opinion.
Given the prevalent tensions and rivalries in meteorology, Scott’s generosity
toward the Dutch professor comes across as an anomaly. The general accep-
tance of Buys Ballot’s law, however, can largely be attributed to Scott’s efforts.
Unlike other meteorological investigators, Scott had no pet theory of his own.
As we have seen, increasing public pressure had turned the suspension of the
British storm warning system into a pressing impasse, and he was badly in need
of a principle to sanction and reinstate the service at the Meteorological Ofﬁce.
Buys Ballot’s wind rule provided him with a way to save face and restore the
reputation of his department, which had been damaged by the awkward
handling of the Fitzroy affair. Most importantly, Buys Ballot’s ‘‘law’’ offered
a means to make meteorology scientiﬁc rather than merely empirical. Predic-
tive sciences are generally equated with exact sciences based upon laws.169
Why did Buys Ballot receive the sole credit for the law, or differently
phrased, why did the law end up being called ‘‘Buys Ballot’s’’ law? Scott
certainly was not the only contemporary commentator to observe that Buys
Ballot had been preceded by several others who had expressed similar results.
Apart from Scott’s own role in this attribution, three additional factors need to
168. Jelinek, ‘‘U¨ber den Zusammenhang’’ (ref. 165), 331–39; Scott, ‘‘Institution’’ (ref. 165), 595–
601; Fortschritte der Physik 25 (1873): 882–901, on 884.
169. Such a strategic use of the term ‘‘law’’ may not have been exceptional. Three decades
later, in a similar move, geneticists would introduce the term ‘‘Mendel’s laws’’ for similar pur-
poses, distinguishing the new quantitative and experimental science of genetics from qualitative
and speculative biology, marked by the absence of laws. A similar message may also have been at
the root of William Bateson’s coinage ‘‘genetics,’’ its ending being modelled after ‘‘mathematics’’
and ‘‘physics,’’ and unlike that of ‘‘biology’’ and ‘‘geology.’’ Bateson notoriously coined the term
‘‘genetics’’ in 1905 in a letter to Adam Sedgwick; see B. Bateson, William Bateson, F.R.S., Nat-
uralist: His Essays and Addresses together with a short Account of his Life (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1928), 93.
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be singled out. First, as we have seen, Buys Ballot indefatigably promoted his
rule in lectures, publications, and correspondence, both in the Netherlands
and abroad. Although it took almost ten years before the international mete-
orological community was willing to take his rule seriously, when they did,
Buys Ballot was the name that immediately sprang to mind. Second, as Scott
pointed out, Buys Ballot promoted his rule as a method for predicting storms,
and in this respect he certainly was unique. As the issue of storm warnings was
at the center of public interest, this approach ascertained a higher visibility.
Finally, the phrasing itself was attractively simple: ‘‘if a person stands with his
back to the wind, the low pressure area will be on his left.’’ This at least was the
plausible explanation for the general attribution of the law to Buys Ballot given
by the anonymous author of an article on the use of the barometer on board
ships, published in 1871 in a German maritime journal.170
Later in life Buys Ballot admitted that he had put too little effort into the
theoretical elaboration of his wind rule.171 By then he was familiar with the
work of the American meteorologist William Ferrel (1817–1891), who had
published a general derivation of the fact that all moving objects on the surface
of the earth, whether particles of atmospheric air or of ocean water, are de-
ﬂected to the right in the Northern hemisphere and to the left in the Southern
hemisphere, due to the axial rotation of the earth. Ferrel, moreover, had
published this paper almost a year before Buys Ballot put forward the ﬁrst
intimations of his rule. Unfortunately, Ferrel had published his ‘‘Essay on the
Winds and the Currents of the Ocean’’ in a rather obscure journal, the Nash-
ville Journal of Medicine and Surgery.172 In the 1870s, Ferrel and several of his
compatriots pointed out that Buys Ballot’s law was simply a consequence of
Ferrel’s more general work. Some even remarked that ‘‘Buys Ballot’s law’’ was
actually a misnomer. On the one hand, the ‘‘law’’ was little more than an
empirical rule, and on the other hand, it ignored the precedence of Ferrel.173
In the mid-1880s, Buys Ballot approached Ferrel and suggested to rename
the law by adding Ferrel’s name to, and even before, his own name, thereby
acknowledging Ferrel’s priority. Ferrel, however, graciously declined the offer.
It seems appropriate to end this paper with his magnanimous response:
170. ‘‘Der Barometer an Bord,’’ Hansa. Zeitschrift fu¨r Seewesen 8 (1871): 197–98, on 198.
171. Van der Stok, ‘‘Levensbericht’’ (ref. 13), 75.
172. Ferrel, ‘‘Essay on the Winds’’ (ref. 10), 7–19.
173. See, for instance, the remark by Cleveland Abbe: ‘‘The present writer has previously called
attention to the fact that Buys-Ballot’s law, as enunciated by him, is simply a rule.’’ Cleveland Abbe,
‘‘Physics of the Globe,’’ Annual Record of Science and Industry 8 (1879): 91–210, on 173.
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I cannot but admire your great generosity in proposing to connect my name
with yours, and even to put mine ﬁrst, in designating the law known as Buys
Ballot’s law. The law has been too long and too well known by the latter
designation to change it now, if there was any occasion for it. But there is
really none. No one doubts its being an original discovery with you and ﬁrst
promulgated by you, and if, as frequently happens in new discoveries, others
may have similar ideas about the same time, this is no occasion, why the
name of the law should be changed.174
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